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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code A n n . , section 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Whether the district court was correct in concluding that relief
under Rule 60(b)(4) should be denied because a judgment based on personal
service of process by a constable on an authorized agent is a valid judgment.
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion as to the factual
question whether service occurred. Carnes v. Carnes, 668 P.2d 5 5 5 , 557
(Utah 1983); correction of error as to the legal question whether the service
that occurred was legally sufficient. Bonneville Billing v. Whatlev, 9 4 9 P.2d
7 6 8 , 771 (Utah App. 1997). The issues were raised in the court below and
preserved for appeal. (R. at 105, 203-206).
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding that
relief under Rule 60(b)(6) should be denied because the Insurance Company
failed to satisfy any of the necessary prerequisites to relief under Rule
60(b)(6).
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Laub v. South Central
Utah Telephone Association, 657 P.2d 1 3 0 4 , 1306 (Utah 1982). The issues
were raised in the court below and preserved for appeal. (R. at 106, 2 0 8 1

211).
3. Whether the district court was correct in refusing to examine the
merits of the underlying judgment, in the context of a motion for relief from
judgment in which the movant failed to establish a basis for relief under Rule
60(b).
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Board of Education of
Granite School District v. Cox, 384 P.2d 8 0 6 , 808 (Utah 1963). This issue
was raised in the court below and preserved for appeal. (R. at 107-108,
211-212).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Copies of U.R.C.P., Rule 60(b) (prior version) and Rule 60(b) (as
amended) are included in the Addendum attached to the Brief of Appellant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action against three insurance companies for refund of
premiums, and against individual agents for fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty
and negligence. (R. at 1-15)

Plaintiff/Appellee Classic Cabinets, Inc.

(hereinafter "Classic") resolved its claims against the other t w o insurance
companies by settlement, dismissing its claims against them w i t h prejudice.
(R. at 6 7 - 6 8 , 7 1 - 7 2 , 8 3 - 8 4 , and 87-88).
2

Classic resolved its claims against Defendant/Appellant All American
Life Insurance Company (hereinafter the "Insurance Company") by obtaining
a default judgment against the Insurance Company on February 2 7 , 1996.
(R. at 41-42). The Insurance Company waited more than 17 months before
filing, on September 8, 1997, a Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment
Against All American Life Insurance Company (hereinafter the "Motion for
Relief"). (R. at 98-100). The motion was denied by the Honorable Frank B.
Noel, Third District Court, on November 17, 1997. (R. at 229-231). On
December 16, 1 9 9 7 , the Insurance Company filed its Notice of Appeal from
Judge Noel's order. (R. at 232-233).
Statement of Relevant Facts:
1. The Insurance Company is an Illinois corporation doing business in
the State of Utah. (Aff. of J.W. Dewbre, par. 2, R. at 112).
2. CT Corporation System (hereinafter the "Registered Agent") is the
registered agent for the Insurance Company in the State of Utah, (Aff. of
Sandy Streeper, par. 3, R. at 143), and has been since at least 1 9 9 0 .

(Aff.

of Chris L. Schmutz, par. 12, R. at 178, 193).
3. On January 16, 1996, Classic filed the Complaint initiating the
above-captioned action as Civil No. 9 6 0 9 0 0 3 5 5 CV, in the Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah (hereinafter the "Lawsuit").
3

(R. at 1-15).
4. Also on January 16, 1996, Classic's attorney issued a summons
directed specifically to the Insurance Company, and delivered that summons
to Salt Lake County Constable Silvan D. Warnick (hereinafter the
"Constable") for service. (Aff. of Chris L. Schmutz, par. 7, R. at 177).
5. The Constable was familiar with the Registered Agent and w i t h its
employees who accept service, having frequently and regularly served
process there over a ten-year period. (Affidavit of Silvan D. Warnick
(hereinafter "Aff. of Constable", or "Constable's Affidavit"), par. 6, 8, R. at
165).
6. On January 18, 1996, the Constable personally served summons
and complaint in the Lawsuit on the Registered Agent. (|dL, par. 10, R. at
166).
7. The summons was delivered to the Registered Agent at its office on
50 West Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah (R. at 171), where it was handed
by the Constable to Michelle Rehrman, an employee of the Registered Agent
w i t h w h o m the Constable was acquainted by name and face. (Aff. of
Constable, par. 9, 1 1 , R. at 165-166).
8. The summons bore the caption of the Lawsuit and was specifically
addressed to the Insurance Company in the following words: "THE STATE
4

OF UTAH TO ALL AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY dba US LIFE."
(\±, par. 10, R. at 166, 169).
9. The Constable's practice is to stamp the summons and fill in the
date and time of service in the stamp on the copy of the summons left w i t h
the defendant; in the stamp on the return copy, the Constable writes the
name of the person served. (Id., par. 12, R. at 166).
10. Consistent w i t h this practice, the Constable at the time of service
on January 18, 1 9 9 6 , wrote "Michelle Rehrman" on the return copy of the
Insurance Company's summons. (Id., R. at 166, 169).
1 1 . On the same day, the Constable prepared his Affidavit of Service,
which he signed under oath, and to which he attached the return copy of the
Insurance Company's summons (the return copy of the summons and
attached Affidavit of Service are referred to hereinafter as the "Constable's
Return" or the "Return"). (\±, par. 14, R. at 167, 171).
12. On January 2 4 , 1996, the Constable's Return was filed w i t h the
Court. (R. at 22-24).
13. On February 2 7 , 1996, some forty (40) days after the Constable's
service of the summons and complaint on the Registered Agent for the
Insurance Company, the Default of the Insurance Company was entered
pursuant to law by the Clerk of the Court. (R. at 33).
5

14. Following the entry of Default by the Clerk of the Court on
February 2 7 , 1996, Default Judgment was properly entered by the Court in
favor of Plaintiff Classic Cabinets, Inc., and against Defendant Insurance
Company, in the amount of $ 7 7 , 5 2 2 . 1 2 , plus pre-judgment interest in the
amount of $ 1 3 , 5 6 6 . 4 2 , together with attorneys fees and costs in the
amount of $ 1 , 1 3 1 . 0 0 , for a total judgment of $ 9 2 , 2 1 9 . 5 4 (hereinafter the
"Judgment"). (R. at 41-42).
1 5. On March 1 1 , 1 9 9 6 , Notice of Entry of Default Judgment
(hereinafter the "Notice"), including a copy of the actual Judgment, was
served by mail upon the Registered Agent. (Aff. of Schmutz, par. 9, R. at
177, 183-186).
16. The Notice informed the Registered Agent as follows:

"PLEASE

TAKE NOTICE that Default Judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff Classic
Cabinets, Inc., and against Defendant All American Life Insurance Company
dba US Life, on February 2 7 , 1996. A copy of the Default Judgment is
attached hereto." (R. at 4 3 - 4 6 , emphasis added).
17. On March 15, 1996, the Registered Agent acknowledged that it
had received the Notice on March 13, 1996. (Aff. of Sandy Streeper, par.
10, R. at 144; Aff. of Schmutz, par. 10, R. at 177-178).

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Insurance Company's Registered Agent was properly served, first
with summons and complaint, and later w i t h a Notice of Entry of Default
Judgment. Because service was proper, the Default Judgment obtained by
Classic against the Insurance Company was valid and enforceable. When
the Insurance Company waited more than 17 months before filing a motion
under Rule 60(b) for relief from the Judgment, the motion was too late. The
district court properly exercised its discretion in accepting as true the facts
set forth in the Constable's Affidavit and Return, correctly concluded as a
matter of law that the Judgment was valid, and properly denied the Motion
for Relief filed by the Insurance Company. The district court's Order Denying
All American's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.
STANDARDS FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
UNDER RULE 60(b) VARY, DEPENDING
ON THE SUBSECTION AT ISSUE
Motions for relief from judgment in Utah are governed by Rule 60(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. There are 6 subsections of the rule, each
defining a category of situations in which relief from judgment may, under
appropriate circumstances, be justified. The Insurance Company has argued
7

for the applicability of t w o of those subsections: 60(b)(4) and 60(b)(6).
(Brief of Appellant at 12-17). In doing so, however, the Insurance Company
has improperly attempted to graft the more liberal standards of a third
subsection (Rule 60(b)(1)) onto the analysis for relief under Rules 60(b)(4)
and (6).
A. The Standard for Granting Relief Under Rule 60(b)(1) is Liberal, If the
Motion is Filed Within the Rule's Strict Time Limits.
Relief under Rule 60(b)(1) is predicated upon a showing of "mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect." U.R.C.P. 60(b)(1). Courts are
liberal and indulgent in granting relief under Rule 60(b)(1), but only if the
motion for relief is filed within the 3-month time period mandated in the rule,

id.
If a movant fails to file his motion for relief within the 3-month period,
there is no liberality in favor of relief and no policy disfavoring the default
judgment. In fact, Utah cases make it clear that a trial judge has no
discretion to grant an untimely motion under Rule 60(b)(1). As the Utah
Court of Appeals stated in Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., 817 P.2d
382, 387:
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In order for a party to be relieved from judgment under Rule
60(b)(1), the party must demonstrate not only that the judgment
resulted from mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect, but also that the motion to set aside was timely, and
that there exist issues worthy of adjudication, [cite omitted] In
this case, Chipman filed his motion more than fifteen months
after the entry of judgment, well outside the three-month time
period provided by Rule 60(b)(1). Because Chipman's motion
was not timely filed under Rule 60(b)(1), the trial court's
dismissal of the motion was not an abuse of discretion. Indeed,
the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the motion
and would have erred had it done so.
Richins, supra, 817 P.2d at 387 (emphasis added); accord, Kessimakis v.
Kessimakis, 546 P.2d 8 8 8 , 889 (Utah 1976).
Seen in this light, the cases cited on page 10 of the Brief of Appellant,
emphasizing the policy of liberality in granting relief from default judgments,
simply do not apply to the present case. Those cases feature fact situations
where liberality and indulgence were appropriate because the motions were
brought within the three-month time limit of Rule 60(b)(1). In those cases,
the courts stressed the importance of timeliness.
For example, in Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Agla Development Corp.,
611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980), which is quoted at length on page 10 of the
Brief of Appellant, the court addressed the timeliness requirement t w i c e .
The first time was in the following language omitted from the quote in the
Brief of Appellant:

9

It is not to be questioned that in appropriate circumstances
default judgments are justified; and when they are, they are
invulnerable to attack. However, they are not favored in the law,
especially where a party has timely responded with challenging
pleadings.
Interstate, supra, 611 P.2d at 371 (emphasis added).
The second statement by the court in Interstate makes it clear that
indulgence in setting aside default judgments is conditional

upon timeliness in

filing the motion:
[T]he courts are generally indulgent toward the setting aside of
default judgments where there is a reasonable justification or
excuse for the defendant's failure to appear, and where timely
application is made to set it aside.
Id. (Emphasis added).
Other cases cited by the Insurance Company contain similar
statements linking liberality in granting relief to timeliness in filing the motion
for relief. For example, in Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 9 2 , 93 (Utah 1986), the
Court expressly conditioned indulgence in setting aside default judgments
upon timeliness in seeking relief:
The court should be generally indulgent toward setting a
judgment aside where there is reasonable justification or excuse
for the defendant's failure to answer and when timely application
is made.
Katz, supra, 732 P.2d at 93 (emphasis added); accord, Mavhew v. Standard
Gilsonite Co., 376 P.2d 9 5 1 , 952 (Utah 1962); State of Utah v. Musselman.
667 P.2d 1 0 5 3 , 1055-1056 (Utah 1983).
10

Although the expressions of liberality and indulgence set forth on page
10 of the Brief of Appellant are significant where timely motion is made, they
do not apply in the present case. The Insurance Company's Motion for
Relief was filed more than 17 months after entry of Judgment, and the
Insurance Company for that reason is not even seeking relief under Rule
60(b)(1).
As part of its argument for liberality, the Insurance Company argues for
the first time on appeal that default judgments entered without notice may
violate the Open Courts provision of the Utah Constitution (Utah Const., Art.
I, Sec. 11). (Brief of Appellant at 1 1 , n. 4) This argument must be rejected
for t w o reasons: first, because it was not raised in the court below, Pratt v.
City Council of City of Riverton, 639 P.2d 172, 173 (Utah 1981); and
second, because in the present case the Insurance Company unquestionably
received legally sufficient notice. See Argument II below.
B. The Standard for Granting Relief Under Rule 60(b)(4) Involves No
Liberality and is Simply a Question of Law.
A movant filing under Rule 60(b)(4) asserts as the ground for relief that
the judgment is void. The determination of the validity of the judgment is a
mixed question of fact and law. Whether the defendant was served is a
question of fact. Carnes, supra, 668 P.2d at 5 5 7 . Whether the service was
11

legally sufficient is a question of law. Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288, 290291 (Utah 1986).
In deciding a motion under Rule 60(b)(4), there is no discretion and no
liberality. If the judgment is void as a matter of law, relief will be granted. If
the judgment is not void, relief will be denied.
The standard under Rule 60(b)(4) was stated plainly by the Utah
Supreme Court in the Garcia case:
Rule 60(b)(4) ... authorizes relief from void judgments.
Necessarily a motion under this part of the rule differs markedly
from motions under the other clauses of Rule 60(b). There is no
question of discretion on the part of the court when a motion is
under Rule 60(b)(4). ... Either a judgment is void or it is valid.
Determining which may well present a difficult question, but
when that question is resolved, the court must act accordingly.
Garcia, supra, 712 P.2d at 290-291 (emphasis added), quoting w i t h approval
from Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, §2862.
Thus, the decision whether to grant the Insurance Company's Motion
for Relief under Rule 60(b)(4) does not involve "liberality" or "indulgence",
but rather is a matter of determining whether or not the Judgment is void.
As will be shown in Argument II below, the Judgment in the present
case is not void, but instead is valid and enforceable.

12

C. The Standard for Granting Relief Under Rule 60(b)(6) is Selective and
Prohibitive Rather Than Liberal or Indulgent.
The Utah Supreme Court has established the following standard for
relief under Rule 60(b)(6):
Subdivision (7) [now (6)] is the residuary clause of rule 60(b); it
embodies three requirements: First, that the reason be one other
than those listed in subdivisions (1) through (6) [now (5)];
second, that the reason justify relief; and third, that the motion
be made within a reasonable time.
Laub v. South Central Utah Telephone Association, Inc., 657 P.2d 1 3 0 4 ,
1306-1307 (Utah 1982) (Emphasis in original); accord, Richins, supra, 817
P.2d at 3 8 7 .
Courts provide no liberality or indulgence in connection w i t h motions
for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). The standard is restrictive and prohibitive:
"Subsection (7) [now (6)] should be very cautiously and sparingly invoked by
the Court only in unusual and exceptional circumstances."

Laub, supra.

The specific requirements and restrictive rules for granting relief under
Rule 60(b)(6) are applied in default judgment cases as rigorously as in other
cases, w i t h no liberality or indulgence. For example, in Lincoln Benefit Life
Insurance Company v. D.T. Southern Properties, 838 P.2d 6 7 2 , 675 (Utah
App. 1992), default judgment was taken against a defendant on May 2 9 ,
1 9 9 0 . 8 3 8 P.2d at 6 7 3 . Six months later, on November 3 0 , 1 9 9 0 , the
defendant filed a motion for relief under subsection (7) [now (6)]. \cL at 6 7 4 .
13

In the motion, he blamed the default judgment on his former attorney,
claiming that the attorney had assured him that he would "take care of the
matter."

kL at 6 7 4 . The trial court denied the motion. kL

On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the reason for relief
(negligence of the attorney) more properly fit within subsection (1) of Rule
60(b), and since it was brought more than three months after judgment, it
was untimely and denial of the motion was appropriate. kL at 6 7 4 - 6 7 5 .
There was no mention of liberality or indulgence; as soon as it was
determined that the motion was untimely, it was denied. kL
As will be shown in Argument III below, the Motion for Relief in the
present case was also properly denied, because it did not satisfy any of the
three requirements for relief under Rule 60(b)(6).
II.
DENIAL OF RELIEF UNDER RULE 60(b)(4)
WAS PROPER BECAUSE PERSONAL SERVICE
BY A CONSTABLE ON A REGISTERED
AGENT IS EFFECTIVE SERVICE AND
NO OTHER SERVICE IS REQUIRED
The Insurance Company argues for relief under Rule 60(b)(4), urging
that the Judgment is void for lack of service. (Brief of Appellant at 12-14).
The Insurance Company contends, first, that the Registered Agent was not
served (kL at 5-6, 13), and alternatively, that the Insurance Company itself
14

did not receive actual notice of the Lawsuit (]dL at 5-6, 14). Neither
argument is persuasive.
A. The Constable Unquestionably Served the Registered Agent.
The Constable's Affidavit and Return establish the following facts:
that the Constable received a summons in the Lawsuit, specifically addressed
to the Insurance Company; that he personally delivered that summons to the
Registered Agent's office in Salt Lake City on January 18, 1 9 9 6 ; that he
handed the summons to Michelle Rehrman, an employee of the Registered
Agent known to him by name and face; that he wrote her name on the
return copy of the summons while in the Registered Agent's office; and that
later the same day he prepared his Affidavit of Service, which he signed
under oath. (Statement of Relevant Facts, above, par. 3-12, R. at 164-174).
The rule is well established that "[t]he sheriff's return of service of
process is presumptively correct and is prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein." Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1 1 8 2 , 1185 (Utah 1991) (emphasis
added).
Classic is not required to submit anything more than the evidence
summarized above, in order to establish the validity of its Judgment. The
burden of proof is upon the Insurance Company to overcome the Constable's
affidavit and return. kL Furthermore, the return cannot be overcome by
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anything less than clear and convincing evidence. Carnes v. Carnes, 668
P.2d 5 5 5 , 557 (Utah 1983).
The type of evidence needed to meet the "clear and convincing"
standard has been discussed by the Florida Court of Appeals. In Slomowitz
v. Walker, 4 2 9 So.2d 797 (Fla. App. 4 Dist. 1983), a default judgment was
entered based on a deputy sheriff's return of service. 4 2 9 So.2d at 7 9 8 .
Some years later, the judgment debtor filed a motion to set the judgment
aside, claiming she had not been served, i d .
The trial court set aside the judgment, based on evidence indicating
that the process server no longer had a present recollection of service, the
judgment debtor denied having been served, and another witness testified
that the debtor never frequented the business location at which service had
occurred. kL.
On appeal, the Florida Court of Appeals began its analysis by defining
the level of proof needed to overcome a return of service:
Florida cases have consistently held that: To impeach the return
of a sheriff, made under the sanction of official oath and
responsibility, clear and convincing evidence is required.
Id. at 799 (emphasis added).
Having established the standard of proof-clear and convincing
evidence-the Florida Court undertook to define the term and apply it to the
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case then on appeal. In doing so, the court cited numerous cases which had
discussed the meaning of the term, and concluded as follows:
Our review of the foregoing cases convinces us that a workable
definition of clear and convincing evidence must contain both
qualitative and quantitative standards. We therefore hold that
clear and convincing evidence requires that the evidence must be
found to be credible; the facts to which the witnesses testify
must be distinctly remembered; the testimony must be precise
and explicit and the witnesses must be lacking in confusion as to
the facts in issue. The evidence must be of such weight that it
produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or
conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations
sought to be established.
Slomowitz, supra, 4 2 9 So.2d at 8 0 0 (emphasis added).
Under that standard, the Florida court ruled that the evidence relied on
by the trial court in setting aside the judgment was insufficient, and therefore
the court reversed the decision below, and upheld the default judgment.
The standard set forth in Slomowitz is consistent w i t h Utah law:
The Utah Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Wolfe,
defined the type of evidence needed to be clear and convincing:
That proof is convincing which carries w i t h it, not only the
power to persuade the mind as to the probable truth or
correctness of the fact it purports to prove, but has the element
of clinching such truth or correctness. Clear and convincing
proof clinches what might be otherwise only probable to the
mind ... But for a matter to be clear and convincing to a
particular mind it must at least have reached the point where
there remains no serious or substantial doubt as to the
correctness of the conclusion.
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Bovette v. L.W. Loonev & Son, Inc., 932 F.Supp. 1344, 1347 (D. Utah
1996) (emphasis added in Bovette
).

In the present case, the Insurance Company has not even come close
to the clear and convincing evidence needed to overcome the Constable's
return. The only possible source of "precise and explicit" testimony capable
of controverting the Constable's Return would have been Michelle Rehrman.
She is the only other person with direct knowledge of what occurred when
the summons and complaint were served.
On July 8, 1997, a copy of the Constable's Return was mailed to the
Insurance Company's counsel in Salt Lake City. (R. at 194). The
Constable's Return identified Michelle Rehrman as the individual upon w h o m
service was made. (R. at 171).
From July 8, 1997, until the Court's Minute Entry of October 2 9 ,
1997, denying the Motion for Relief, 113 days passed, or nearly 4 months.
(R. at 219). The Insurance Company had nearly four months in which to
locate Michelle Rehrman, obtain her testimony, and submit an affidavit
disputing the Constable's Affidavit, if indeed it had been inaccurate.
No such affidavit was ever submitted. Nor did the Insurance Company
ever submit any pleadings to the court below indicating that Michelle
Rehrman could not be located, was not at work on January 18, 1 9 9 6 , or
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was not (as alleged by the Constable) an employee of the Registered Agent.
Rather than submitting the potentially "credible", "distinctly
remembered", and "precise and explicit" testimony of Michelle Rehrman, the
Insurance Company relied upon the Affidavit of Sandy Streeper. (R. at 142147). Ms. Streeper's affidavit contained no evidence contradicting the
Constable's Affidavit and Return. This is not surprising, since Ms. Streeper
was not present when service was made. (Aff. of Constable, par. 1 1 , R. at
166). She was not the employee served. (Id.) She had no personal
knowledge as to whether or not service was made. Her only testimony was
that she had searched the Registered Agent's computer database without
being able to locate therein the appropriate entry acknowledging service of
the summons on the Insurance Company in the Lawsuit. (Aff. of Streeper,
par. 7, R. at 143).
Lacking actual evidence to undercut the Constable's Return, the
Insurance Company has resorted to speculation (Brief of Appellant at 5), as
well as nitpicking and wishful thinking (kL at 6, note 3), in an attempt to
create some doubt regarding the Constable's service.
The Insurance Company has also raised at least one argument that
cannot be considered on appeal because it was not presented to the court
below: the argument, proposed initially on page 6, note 3 and later repeated
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on pages 13 and 14 of the Brief of Appellant, that the Constable failed to
note on his Return the time of day of service as required by U.C.A. §78-12a2(3). Utah's courts have consistently held that they will not consider on
appeal an issue not reached or ruled on by the trial court. Broberg v. Hess,
782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989).
The Constable's Return must be controverted by clear and convincing
evidence. This means evidence that is not only "credible" and "precise and
explicit", but also evidence that produces a firm belief, without hesitancy, as
to the truth of the allegations sought to be established. Slomowitz, supra,
4 2 9 So.2d at 8 0 0 . The fact sought to be established by the Insurance
Company was that the Constable did not serve summons and complaint on
the Registered Agent.
Viewing the evidence presented to it in light of the applicable legal
standard, the district court's acceptance of the factual accuracy of the
Constable's Return (R. at 219) was an appropriate exercise of its discretion;
and its denial of the Motion for Relief under Rule 60(b)(4) was correct as a
matter of law. Garcia, supra, 712 P.2d at 2 9 0 - 2 9 1 .
B. It Was Not Necessary For Classic To Give Additional Notice of the
Lawsuit.
The Brief of Appellant emphasizes that the Insurance Company did not
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receive "actual" notice of the Lawsuit. (Brief of Appellant at 8, 14)
The Insurance Company is not an individual. It is a large corporation,
acting on a national scale through many different agents and employees. Its
principal office is, or was, in Chicago (R. at 138, 178), and it has regional
offices at least in New York and Dallas. (R. at 112, 178).
In Utah, the insurance company is a foreign corporation without any
office or representative, so far as the record reflects, other than CT
Corporation System, which has served as its Registered Agent at least since
1990. (R. at 143, 178, 193).
Every foreign corporation doing business in Utah is required to have
and maintain a registered agent. Utah Code A n n . , §16-10a-1508.

Every

such registered agent is authorized by statute to receive service of process:
The registered agent of a foreign corporation authorized to
transact business in this state is the foreign corporation's agent
for service of process, demand, notice, or demand required or
permitted by law to be served on the foreign corporation.
Utah Code A n n . , §16-10a-1511(1) (emphasis added).
Service on the Registered Agent bound the Insurance Company even if
no other officers, employees or agents of the Insurance Company were
aware of the service. U.R.C.P., Rule 4(e)(5).
In Brown Grain & Livestock, Inc. v. Union Pacific Resource Company,
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878 P.2d 157 (Colo. App. 1994), a plaintiff sued t w o defendants. Both
defendants had designated the "Corporation Company" as their registered
agent for service of process. Brown at 158. Plaintiff's process server
served t w o summonses on the agent (the Corporation Company), which
mistakenly forwarded both of them to only one of the t w o defendants. UL
The other defendant (Union Pacific Resource Company) failed to answer the
complaint and had default judgment entered against it. j d . When its motion
to set aside the default judgment was denied, Union Pacific appealed.
On appeal, the Colorado Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's
denial of Union Pacific's motion to set aside the default judgment, holding as
follows:
When an agent acts within the scope of his or her authority,
knowledge of the agent is knowledge of the principal. [Cite
omitted]. Thus, if a defendant selects as its designated agent a
company receiving service of process for numerous other
entities, the defendant takes a risk that errors in transmittal by
its agent, such as occurred here, will bind the principal.
Brown, supra, 878 P.2d at 158 (emphasis added).
When Classic filed its complaint and issued summons for service upon
the Insurance Company, Classic was not required to identify, track down and
serve the Insurance Company's president in Chicago, its General Counsel in
Dallas, or any of hundreds or perhaps thousands of other possible officers,
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agents, or employees of the Insurance Company, in order to effectuate
service. Classic was simply required to serve a copy of the summons and
complaint on the Insurance Company's Registered Agent in Utah. See
U.C.A. §16-10a-1511 and U.R.C.P., Rule 4(e)(5). Service by the Constable
on the Registered Agent was proper, sufficient and complete. Based on that
service, the Judgment was valid, no further notice was required, and the
court below correctly denied the Motion for Relief under Rule 60(b)(4).
III.
DENIAL OF RELIEF UNDER RULE 60(b)(6)
WAS PROPER BECAUSE THE INSURANCE
COMPANY FAILED TO SATISFY ANY OF
THE THREE PREREQUISITES TO RELIEF
As noted above, Utah case law has defined three requirements for
granting relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6): first, that the reason for
relief be one other than those listed in subdivisions (1) through (5) of the
Rule; second, that the reason justify relief; and third, that the motion be
made within a reasonable time. Laub, supra, 657 P.2d at 1 3 0 6 - 1 3 0 7 .
The Insurance Company cannot satisfy any of the three requirements.
A. The Reason for Relief Has Also Been Asserted Under Rule 60(b)(4) and
Therefore Cannot be Asserted Under Rule 60(b)(6).
The Insurance Company's sole expressed reason for relief is its claim
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of invalid service. (Brief of Appellant at 12) As discussed above, this claim
fits under Rule 60(b)(4) and for that reason cannot be used as a basis for
relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Laub, supra.
B. The Reason Does Not Justify Relief Under Rule 60(b)(6).
As shown above, the Insurance Company is not entitled to relief from
judgment on the grounds of invalid service, either under Rule 60(b)(4) or
under Rule 60(b)(6), because the service was proper and effective.
C. The Motion for Relief Was Not Brought Within a "Reasonable Time" as
Required Under Rule 60(b)(6).
The third element which must be demonstrated for relief under
Subsection (6) is that the motion for relief be filed within a reasonable time.
Laub, supra, 657 P.2d 1306-1307. In this case, Notice of Entry of
Judgment (hereinafter "Notice") was mailed to the Registered Agent on
March 1 1 , 1997. (Aff. of Schmutz, par. 9). Included in the Notice was a
copy of the Judgment itself. (Id.) It is undisputed that the Insurance
Company's registered agent received the Notice and Judgment on March 13,
1996, nearly seventeen months before the motion was filed. (Aff. of
Streeper, par. 10, R. at 144).
Even if the Registered Agent had not been served w i t h summons and
complaint (which it was) the receipt by the Registered Agent of the Notice
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and Judgment provided actual notice to the agent, and therefore to the
Insurance Company, that the Judgment had been entered. It was incumbent
upon the Insurance Company, if it believed it had grounds for setting aside
the Judgment, to act quickly, and certainly within a reasonable time, to seek
relief from that Judgment.
A reasonable time for filing the motion in this case would have been
the three-month period established in Rule 60(b), since most of that initial
three-month period was still available to the Insurance Company as of March
13, 1 9 9 6 . Seventeen months was not a reasonable time to wait before filing
the motion.
In the Laub case, a delay of six months before filing a motion to set
aside a judgment was considered unreasonable for purposes of Subsection
(7) [now (6)]. Laub, supra, 657 P.2d at 1307. And in Matter of Estate of
Pepper, 711 P.2d 2 6 1 , 2 6 4 (Utah 1985), nine months was considered too
long a time.
In Workman v. Naqle Construction, Inc., 802 P.2d 749 (Utah App.
1990), a defendant against w h o m judgment had been entered filed a motion
to set the judgment aside. Workman at 7 5 0 . In the motion, the defendant
claimed that the judgment entered against her was void because the plaintiff
had failed to send her notice of entry of the judgment as required in U.R.C.P.
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58A(d). Jd,.
On appeal after denial of the defendant's motion, the Utah Court of
Appeals held that failure to send notice as required in Rule 58A(d) did not
make the judgment void or affect its enforceability. kL at 7 5 1 . The Court of
Appeals also held, however, that a judgment

debtor's

inaction, after receipt

of a notice under Rule 58A(d), would affect a court's determination as to
whether a motion to set the judgment aside was filed within a reasonable
time under Subsection (6):
If a party has had notice of the judgment but has nevertheless
remained idle in attacking it in the court of rendition or in
appealing it, that lack of diligence is a strong reason not to
disturb the judgmentWorkman, supra, 802 P.2d at 751 (emphasis added).
In an attempt to persuade this Court that its Motion for Relief was filed
within a reasonable time, despite its Agent's admitted receipt of notice more
than 17 months earlier, the Insurance Company has made three arguments,
t w o of which were not presented to the court below. All three arguments
are factually inaccurate and legally insupportable.
1. Under Rule 58A(d), Classic was required to serve the Notice,
not on the Registered Agent (who was the agent for service of
' process only), but directly on the Insurance Company.
This argument was made for the first time on pages 6, 8-9, and 20-21
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of the Brief of Appellant. The argument was not presented to the court
below (see R. at 101-147, 199-214) and for that reason cannot be
considered on appeal. Broberq v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App.
1989).
In any event, the argument is legally insupportable. Utah Code A n n . ,
§ 1 6 - 1 0 a - 1 5 1 1 , which defines the scope of the Registered Agent's
competence, makes it clear that the Agent is appointed not only for receipt
of service of process, but for "service of process, notice or demand required
or permitted by law to be served on the foreign corporation."

U.C.A.§16-

10a-1511 (1) (emphasis added).
Because the Registered Agent was, under the statute, authorized to
received the Notice on behalf of the Insurance Company, mailing the Notice
to the Registered Agent was appropriate under Rule 5(b)(1).
2. The Notice was defective, because the envelope in which
Classic sent the Notice did not identify the Insurance Company,
so the Registered Agent returned the Notice to Classic's attorney
w i t h a request for additional information, which was never
provided.
This argument, which was made to the court below (R. at 2 0 5 - 2 0 6 ) , is
misleading and irrelevant. The argument is misleading because it attempts to
focus attention on the envelope rather than on the Notice. It is true that the
address on the outside of the envelope did not identify the Insurance
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Company. (R. at 192) But that did not cause any difficulties for the
Registered Agent at the time.
Ms. Streeper's letter, which accompanied the Notice returned to
Classic's attorney, said nothing about the envelope. Instead, it stated the
following:
On March 13, 1996, CT Corporation System ("CT") received, by
Regular Mail a Notice of entry of default judgment in the above
entitled action. The documents failed to note which party is
being served, therefor we are unable to forward the documents
to the proper party.
R. at 187 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in her Affidavit, Ms. Streeper said nothing about the
envelope, but instead acknowledged, again, that she had received the
Notice, and for some unknown reason concluded that it was not addressed
to a particular corporate entity. (Aff. of Streeper, par. 1 0 - 1 1 , R. at 144).
It was not the envelope which confused Ms. Streeper; it was the
Notice itself. It is difficult to understand the source of her confusion, since
the Notice identified the Insurance Company as the affected party more than
once and in no uncertain terms. (See Statement of Relevant Facts, par. 16,
page 6 above).
The additional information requested by Ms. Streeper was the "full
name" of the corporation. Since the full name of the Insurance Company
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was already on the Notice, and on the Judgment, no further information was
required. The Notice was valid as sent.

3. Classic deliberately and intentionally concealed the Judgment
from the Insurance Company by not sending the Notice directly
to the Insurance Company.
This argument was made for the first time on pages 8-9, 17, 19, 20
and 21 of the Brief of Appellant. The argument was not presented to the
court below (see R. at 101-147, 199-214) and for that reason cannot be
considered on appeal. Broberq v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App.
1989).
In any event, the argument is factually misleading and legally
irrelevant. The argument is misleading because it implies the Insurance
Company was fully responsive to Classic, that Classic knew its claims
against the Insurance Company were insupportable and intentionally tried to
get a default judgment against the Insurance Company. This is simply not
true.
It was the Insurance Company, not Classic, which broke off
communications and refused to provide information prior to litigation.
Following Classic's initial letter (R. at 138-139) and the Insurance
Company's initial response (R. at 140), Classic's attorney sent a letter to the
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Insurance Company, requesting information and documents relating to
Classic's claims and the Insurance Company's defenses. (R. at 180). The
Insurance Company ignored the request, never responded to the letter, and
never provided any information or documents. (Aff. of Schmutz, par. 6, R.
at 176, 180).
Classic waited more than a year for a response from the Insurance
Company before filing suit.

When the Insurance Company never responded,

Classic had no realistic choice but to file suit. When Classic did file suit, and
when it obtained the Judgment, Classic had no information tending to
establish any defenses to its claims. The Insurance Company did not
respond to Classic when Classic informally requested documents. It was
only when Classic was collecting a Judgment that the Insurance Company
belatedly attempted to address the merits of the claims against it. By that
time, however, the Judgment was more than 17 months old and the merit
were moot. See Cox, supra, 384 P.2d at 8 0 8 .
IV.
THE MERITS OF THE UNDERLYING JUDGMENT
SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL
FROM THE MOTION FOR RELIEF
The Insurance Company has submitted information both to the court
below and to this Court regarding the merits of its claimed defenses. (Aff. of
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Dewbre, par. 5-15, R. at 112-114; Brief of Appellant at 4-5, 21-22).
The court below properly declined to consider the Insurance
Company's claimed defenses. (R. at 2 1 9 , 161-162). It is inappropriate as a
matter of law to consider the merits of any claimed defense on a motion to
set aside a judgment, unless and until the movant proves entitlement to relief
under one of the subsections of Rule 60(b). In Board of Education of Granite
School District v. Cox, 3 8 4 P.2d 806 (Utah 1963), the Court stated:
Appellant in asserting the Statute of Frauds and lack of
consideration has set forth defenses which apply to the merits of
the case and have no application as to w h y appellant did not
answer within the time allotted. We are concerned only w i t h
w h y he did not answer, not with what kind of answer would he
give if he were so inclined. This latter question arises only after
consideration of the first question and a sufficient excuse
therefrom being shown.
Board of Education, supra, 3 8 4 P.2d at 808 (emphasis added).
More recently, the Utah Supreme Court reinforced the Cox rule in
these words:
This Court's statement in the Cox decision (quoted immediately
above) clearly sets forth the policy in this jurisdiction requiring
that the lower court consider and resolve the question of
excusable neglect (when the motion to vacate the default
judgment is based on excusable neglect ) prior to its
consideration of the issue of whether a meritorious defense
exists. Furthermore, in accordance w i t h this policy, it is
unnecessary, and moreover inappropriate, to even consider the
issue of meritorious defenses unless the court is satisfied that a
sufficient excuse has been shown.
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State of Utah v. Musselman, supra, 667 P.2d at 1056 (emphasis added).
On appeal from the district court's denial of the Motion for Relief, the
merits of claimed defenses to the underlying Judgment should not be
reviewed. As the Idaho Court of Appeals recently observed:
It has been held that a Rule 60(b) motion is not a substitute for a
timely appeal, [cites omitted] ... However persuasive the
[appellant's] assertions of legal error might have been on a direct
appeal, timely taken, our review of the [appellant's] appeal in its
present procedural posture is strictly limited to determining
whether the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b) motion
constituted an abuse of discretion. ... [W]e can only consider
whether the denial of the motion was an abuse of discretion; we
cannot reach the merits of the underlying judgment.
Ade v. Batten, 878 P.2d 8 1 3 , 815-816 (Idaho App. 1994) (emphasis added).
V.
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REMAND
FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
The Insurance Company asks this Court to remand to the district court
for an evidentiary hearing on the sufficiency of notice. (Brief of Appellant at
14 n. 5). There are three reasons, each one sufficient alone, for this Court
not to remand for an evidentiary hearing.
A. There Is No Substantial Dispute Regarding The Sufficiency Of Service.
As pointed out in Argument II above, the testimony of the Constable is
clear, detailed, direct and consistent, and establishes all the necessary
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factual elements of sufficient service. In marked contrast, the Insurance
Company submitted no evidence to the district court, other than the
Registered Agent's inability to confirm that a record of the service was
entered into its computer files. (Aff. of Streeper, par. 7, R. at 143).
The Insurance Company's evidence was too weak, indirect and
minimal to rise to a level anywhere near the "clear and convincing" evidence
needed to overcome the Constable's Return. Carnes, supra, 668 P.2d at
557.
This case is factually distinguishable from the cases cited by the
Insurance Company in support of its request for remand. For example, in
Davis v. Musler, 713 F.2d 907 (2d. Cir. 1983), the Court relied heavily upon
the specific facts of the case in coming to the conclusion that remand was
necessary:
Standing alone, the weasel-worded affidavit submitted by Musler
in the instant action might not be sufficient to support
defendants' position. But we cannot overlook that both
defendants did assert in identical unequivocal language in
affidavits submitted in the supplementary proceedings "That on
June 3, 1 9 8 1 , I was not at home all day, as I was out on
personal errands, shopping, etc."
Davis, supra, 713 F.2d at 9 1 4 (emphasis added).
The court in Davis pointed out another fact unique to that case which
caused it to believe an evidentiary hearing was necessary: that a state court
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in Florida had quashed the subpoenas served at the same time as summons
and complaint, creating an inference that service was improper. IdL
The unusual circumstances in the Davis case, which compelled the
court there to conclude that an evidentiary hearing was required, do not exist
in the present case. Because the Insurance Company's evidence fell so far
short of the level required to challenge the Constable's Return, no evidentiary
hearing was required. The district court did not abuse its discretion in failing
to conduct an evidentiary hearing before determining that service of process
occurred and was sufficient.

B. Motion Practice in Utah Does Not Contemplate Evidentiary Hearings
Under Rule 60(b).
Rule 60(b) is actuated by motion:
The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be
by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent
action.
U.R.C.P. 60(b) (emphasis added).
Motion practice in Utah does not contemplate evidentiary hearings.
There is no provision in the Utah rules or statutes establishing a right or
necessity to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to determination of a
motion under Rule 60(b).
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In contrast, in an "independent action", which is an alternative method
for seeking relief from a judgment, an evidentiary hearing, or trial, would
have been the natural culmination of the action unless appropriately
concluded sooner by summary judgment.
The Insurance Company chose to seek relief by motion rather than by
an independent action, and in so doing relinquished the right to have their
allegations regarding the sufficiency of service aired in an evidentiary
hearing.
In similar circumstances, the Oregon Court of Appeals ruled that a trial
judge's refusal to conduct an evidentiary hearing was not abuse of
discretion. In State ex rel. Frohnmaver v. Low, 8 0 4 P.2d 1217 (Or. App.
1991), service was made on the defendant by delivering summons and
complaint to his wife at an address in California. kL at 1218. About eight
months after default judgment was entered for non-appearance, the
defendant filed a motion to set aside the judgment. kL Both parties
submitted affidavits on the issue of the sufficiency of service. kL at 1219.
A t a hearing on the motion to set aside the judgment, the defendant
requested an opportunity to present oral testimony. kL The request was
denied. ]dL The trial judge decided the issue of service on the affidavits and
oral argument. jdL
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On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals held as follows:
In the absence of a statutory right to give oral testimony, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request.
Frohnmaver, supra, 8 0 4 P.2d at 1219-1220.
The Court in Frohnmaver went on to note that the evidence submitted
by affidavit was conflicting as to whether the California address was the
defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode. kL. at 1220. After
reviewing the conflicting evidence, the Court concluded that there was
sufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusion:
Under those facts, the trial court did not err when it held that
substituted service properly occurred at defendant's usual place
of abode, [cite omitted] Therefore, service is presumed to be
reasonably calculated to apprise defendant of the action and to
afford him a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend.
Nothing in the record overcomes the presumption and the default
judgment is not void.
\_± at 1220 (emphasis added).
In the present case, although Judge Noel did not order an evidentiary
hearing, he did carefully consider all the affidavits and briefs submitted by
both parties and, based upon the facts set forth therein, concluded that the
Judgment was valid and the Motion for Relief should be denied. (See Order
Denying All American's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, R. at 229230).
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Since the Insurance Company elected to proceed by motion, a
procedure which did not contemplate an evidentiary hearing, and since there
was nothing in the evidence submitted by the Insurance Company's
affidavits to overcome the presumption in favor of the Constable's Return,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Motion for Relief
without an evidentiary hearing.
C. The Insurance Company Failed to Request a Hearing or Object to the
Lack of a Hearing.
Utah's rules provide a means for requesting a hearing on any motion.
(See Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501 (3)). If the Insurance
Company desired to cross-examine the Constable, or produce Michelle
Rehrman as a live witness, or believed for any other reason that an
evidentiary hearing was necessary or appropriate, it could have requested
such a hearing. See Reed v. Reed, supra, 806 P.2d at 1 1 8 5 , where an
evidentiary hearing was conducted, at defendant's request, on the issue of
sufficiency of service. In the present case, the Insurance Company never
requested a hearing. (Order, page 2, R. at 230).
Utah's appellate courts have stated repeatedly that they will not
consider claimed errors related to evidence, or the lack thereof, for the first
time on appeal. For example, in Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 4 9 1 (Utah
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1980), the trial court admitted a summary of testimony into evidence. \jL at

494.
On appeal from an adverse judgment, the defendants in Condas argued
for the first time that the proponent of the summary had not proven that the
witnesses were unavailable for trial as a precondition to the admissibility of
the summary. kL at 4 9 5 . The Utah Supreme Court refused to consider this
issue, noting as follows:
Had defendants objected to this representation, plaintiffs would
have had an opportunity to produce evidence that these
witnesses were unavailable. Defects curable at trial cannot be
relied upon by a party if the trial court has had no opportunity to
rule thereon.

Condas, supra, 618 P.2d at 4 9 5 , n. 8 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in the case of LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P.2d 189
(Utah App. 1991), the trial court entered summary judgment on the issue of
liability and then instructed the parties to submit affidavits on the damages
issue. |dL at 192. After reviewing the affidavits, the trial court granted
judgment in an amount certain based on the affidavits. IdL
On appeal, the defendants argued that the trial judge had deprived
them of their constitutional right to trial by deciding the damages issue on
the affidavits rather than at trial. kL at 197. The Court of Appeals refused
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to consider the argument:
We do not reach the merits of this argument because it was not
adequately preserved for appeal by a timely objection during the
trial proceedings. It is axiomatic that matters not presented to
the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal.
LMV Leasing, supra, 805 P.2d at 197 (emphasis added).
In the present case, even if it had been appropriate to hold an
evidentiary hearing in the district court, the Insurance Company's failure to
request a hearing at the trial level prevents it from requesting remand for an
evidentiary hearing now.
VI.
THE ATTORNEYS FEES AWARDED IN THE
JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT BE REVIEWED
ON APPEAL FROM DENIAL OF A MOTION
FOR RELIEF FROM THE JUDGMENT
The Insurance Company argues for the first time on appeal that the
attorneys fees awarded in the Judgment were inappropriate. (Brief of
Appellant at 23-24). The relief sought by the Insurance Company is for the
" a w a r d " to be "reversed". kJL
The argument was not made to the court below. In the Insurance
Company's opening brief in the district court, at page 6, the argument was
made that the Judgment should be set aside because the Insurance
Company had not yet had an opportunity to dispute the merits of Classic's
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claim, including its claim to attorneys fees (R. at 106). However, no
argument was made that the attorneys fees should be set aside. The only
argument made was that the Insurance Company should have relief from the
Judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) in order to dispute the validity of the claims,
including the claim to fees. kL
It is an entirely different argument to urge, as the Insurance Company
does for the first time on appeal, that the attorneys fees portion of the
Judgment should be "reversed", and, presumably, removed from the
Judgment.
Having failed to make the argument below, the Insurance Company
cannot make it for the first time on appeal.
Even if the argument had been made below, it is misplaced. A motion
under Rule 60(b) does not reach the merits of the case, and an appeal from
denial of such a motion brings up only the denial of the motion and not the
merits of the underlying judgment itself. Ade, supra, 878 P.2d at 8 1 5 - 8 1 6 .
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Classic requests the Court to enter its
order affirming the district court's Order Denying All American's Motion to
Set Aside Default Judgment.
DATED this

of July, 1998.
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